Spencer Brown’s mark consists of a vertical line that separates two side, and a horizontal line that points to one side and not the other, and could thus be called an indicator or pointer. The mark is consciously thought of as one sign but it consists of two components. However, if we start out in this manner, a question arises: who could designate one but not the other component without already having a sign for this particular purpose at this disposal? Thus, we must first of all simply accept the mark as a unified mark. . . .
Category: System/Environment
Open and closed systems
There are no truly closed systems, except for purely conceptual systems, e.g. the physicist’s imaginary box that is isolated from all outside influences.
The pandemic and the myth of balance
The preoccupation with balance belongs to an older form of society–one based on hierarchy and centralized control. Autopoietic systems never reach a condition of equilibrium. There is never balance between system and environment, but systems can still be relatively stable over the long term. Stable systems do not need to be in equilibrium. A physical structure like a table can be balanced, but living, evolving systems cannot be balanced.
Social Resonance and System Rationality
System rationality means that one takes this back or that one denies the indifference of the system (the fact that whatever happens in the environment does not happen to us) and instead strengthens the irritability, sensitivity, or resonance (or whatever term may be used) of the system.
Luhmann and Matter
When discussing organizations, which Luhmann argues consist entirely of decision-based communication, one might ask about buildings, desks, chairs, telephones, computers, electricity, as well as human beings. Aren’t these things essential to most organizations? Shut off the electricity or the Internet access and most organizations stop functioning. Thus, a common criticism of social systems theory relates to materialism or material agency.
Ontology
The distinction between being and nonbeing is now replaced as primary distinction, completely implausible from an ontological point of view, by the distinction between inside
