Cultural differences should not get in the way of communication, which means the creation of social systems.
In the chapter 3 of Social Systems, the chapter on Double Contingency, Luhmann writes
Nothing forces us to seek the solution for the problem of double contingency exclusively in an already existing consensus, thus in the social dimension. There are functional equivalents–for example, those in the temporal dimension. At first alter tentatively determines his behavior in a situation that is still unclear. He begins with a friendly glance, a gesture, a gift–and waits to see whether and how ego receives the proposed definition of the situation. In light of this beginning, every subsequent step is an action with a contingency-reducing, determining, effect–be it positive or negative. . . . We can connect this to the “order from noise principle” of general systems theory. No preordained value consensus is needed. The problem of double contingency (i.e., empty, closed, indeterminable self-reference) draws in chance straightaway, creates sensitivity to chance, and when no value consensus exists, one can thereby invent it. The system emerges etsi no daretur Deus [even if God doesn’t exist]. (104-05)
Here Luhmann revises Parsons’ concept of double contingency. No value consensus is needed for a social system to form. In the above example, he is talking about an interaction system. A psychic system (alter) encounters a stranger (ego) and makes some move: a friendly glance, a gesture, a gift. If ego responds in a positive way–some way to encourages further communication–then alter can go further into the communication system, or establish a social interaction. There is no need to first ascertain either person’s values, their sense of right and wrong, etc.
Luhmann’s example resembles a borderland or contact zone, as when members of different cultures meet for the first time. In this kind of situation, the past (cultural heritage) doesn’t really matter. The interaction is all about expectations for the future–for subsequent communicative efforts. Alter wants to know if ego will reciprocate in some way. In the beginning the possibilities are wide open; this corresponds to noise on the noise-order spectrum. Ego could walk away, refusing to establish an interaction system, or she could strike alter, shout at him, etc. But after the first positive response, alter starts to expect more positive responses. Thus the horizon of possible responses narrows.
This means that social order is not created by shared values or cultural norms. Social order (some kind of social system) is established through expectations, in other words, a question–What’s next? This is the temporal dimension referred to above.
The social dimension is a dimension of meaning that “concerns what one at any time accepts as like oneself, as ‘alter ego’ (Social Systems 80). Luhmann speaks of two other meaning dimensions: the temporal and the factual.
The temporal dimension is constituted by the fact that the difference before and after, which can be immediately experienced in all events, is referred to specific horizons, namely, is extended into the past and the future. Time’s bond to what can immediately be experienced is thereby dissolved, and time gradually also sheds its relation to a difference between presence and absence. It becomes an independent dimension, ordered only according to when and not to the who/what/where/how of experience and action. (77-78).
In the social dimension, there is an opposition between consensus and dissent.
Only when dissent can emerge as a reality or a possibility has one occasion to interject the two-fold horizon of the social as the dimension of orientation that is especially important at the moment. . . . The social dimension, once available, enables a constantly accompanying comparison with what others can or would experience and how others could position their actions. . . . [The] social dimension tends to boil down to morality. . . . Morality indicates the conditions under which persons can praise of blame one another and themselves. . .
For societies that are becoming increasingly complex, a global programming of the social dimension in the form of morality becomes increasingly inadequate. . . . [All] morality finally finds itself relativized within horizons where one can ask further why someone experiences , judges, and acts in the way he does, how this occurs, and what that means for others. (81-82)
A difference is contained in every experience of meaning. As for the factual dimension, the difference is
between what is actually given and what can possibly result from it. This basic difference, which is automatically reproduced in every experience of meaning, given experience informational value. As meaning use progresses, it becomes evident that this and not that is the case; that one continues to experience, to communicate, and to act in one way and not another; that pursuit of specific further possibilities proves its worth or not. . .
The fact dimension is thereby constituted in that meaning divides the reference structure of what is meant into “this” and “something else.” (74, 76)
This is the difference between actuality and the horizon of potentialities.