In “From Norms to Trust: The Luhmannian Connections between Trust and System,” Janne Jalava, of the University of Helsinki, writes,
One of the best-known early theories by Niklas Luhmann is his theory of trust. In his book, Vertrauen (1968), Luhmann presented his basic theses about trust. The function of trust is to reconstruct or to reduce the growing complexity of society.(European Journal of Social Theory, 2003)
In this insightful article, Javala contrasts Luhmann’s theory of trust with that of Talcott Parsons, which was based on structural functionalism. In discussing Parsons’ theory of structural functionalism, Javala writes,
Structural functionalism was based on the assumption that social systems could not function and maintain themselves without a normative foundation.
This normative foundation was said to be provided by cultural patterns and shared values. Thus, culture stood hierarchically above or prior to social systems. For Parsons, trust means trust in other people, which begins in the family system.
For Parsons, trust is typically not–or should not be–a problem in familiar interactions, as among families and friends. Indeed, trust is taken for granted in familiar social contexts. If a child loses trust a parent, this distrust is likely to be generalized. Outside of the family, trust becomes a problem in cases of hierarchy-based competence gaps, such as interactions between a doctor and patient, professor and student, lawyer and client. As Javala writes,
To Parsons the problem of trust emerges in relationships between professionals and lay persons. There is a ‘competence gap’ between the expert and the layman. Because the layman cannot fully understand what the professional (for example, a doctor) is doing, there must be a basis of trusted validation of competence other than the typical layman’s personal competence to evaluate it.
In other words, in interactions with experts, we depend on symbols such as diplomas on a wall, professional titles, letters after the name, and a professional office space. And while we do not share the expert’s professional knowledge, we may share their basic values. Thus, in this Parsonian view, in order for trust to develop between layperson and expert, they must share cultural values. Thus if a doctor shows up in dirty jeans and a T-shirt, the patient is likely to question the doctor’s competence.
I agree with Javala that the Parsonian view of trust has limited explanatory power in the functionally differentiated global society. Parsonian systems theory is based on human action networks, and a theory of society built on action networks will concern itself with behavioral norms, cultural patterns, and the institutions responsible for socialization.
Luhmann’s conception of trust is different. For Luhmann, trust is a central issue in all communication. He argues that
a society that uses language and signs gives rise to the problem of error and deception, of the unintentional and intentional abuse of signs. It is not only that communication occasionally miscarries, goes astray, or takes the wrong track. The problem, since it can occur at any time, is always present–a sort of universal problem of the type discovered by Hobbes with his example of violence. With this in mind, it is understandable that society morally appreciates sincerity, truthfulness, and the like, and in the communication process it has to rely on trust. (Theory of Society, vol 1., p 135)
The reference to what can occur at any time being always present is interesting. Trust is not merely something that is needed when dealing with experts or strangers, trust is required for any communication at all. It is not merely the actions or potential actions of other people that raise the trust issue; on a more basic level, communication itself requires trust.
Here is the main difference between Parsons and Luhmann regarding trust: Rather than thinking of trust as trust in other people, Luhmann sees trust as trust in system functions. Here is what Luhmann wrote in 1997 (English translation 2012),
Modern computer technology . . . attacks the authority of experts. In principle everyone will in the future be able to check on statements of experts such as physicians and lawyers on his own computer. . . . Although it is difficult to check how knowledge finds its way into the computer, it can at any rate not be turned into an authority. Naturally, this does not change the fact that everyone who relies on communication in one way or another has to depend on trust. But in the age of electronic data processing, this trust can no longer be personalized, no longer implemented in social status; it is now only trust in the system. (Theory of Society, vol. 1, 188)
Given that the Internet age was just getting started in 1997, Luhmann’s remarks here seem prescient. Consider sites such as WebMD, for instance. The website itself, rather than the humans providing content or running the website, has to look credible and a have a good reputation. We also have to trust that our computer is working properly and that a website or network hasn’t been hacked.
In a globalized, functionally differentiated society, communication accelerates. And when you factor in the Internet and social media, communication really speeds up. This suggests that the capacity to trust may be overburdened, which may help explain the proliferation of conspiracy theories. Every communicative event entails trust and the risk of deception, or the risk of error or the incompetence of a trusted person. Thus we are living in a “risk society.”
Trust reduces complexity by relieving the social system of the task of verifying every bit of information. We don’t have time to research the credentials of every doctor, teacher, stock broker, police officer, etc., that we have to deal with. We have to trust in the organizations or institutions that certify these professionals. If a social system has to verify everything before communication happens, then communication will never happen. If I don’t trust the police, for instance, my daily life becomes more complicated. Trust reduces social complexity. Trust, then, is the starting point. We trust until our expectations are disappointed.
According to Hobbes, the justification for political obligation is this: given that men are naturally self-interested, yet they are rational, they will choose to submit to the authority of a Sovereign in order to be able to live in a civil society, which is conducive to their own interests. Hobbes argues for this by imagining men in their natural state, or in other words, the State of Nature. In the State of Nature, which is purely hypothetical according to Hobbes, men are naturally and exclusively self-interested, they are more or less equal to one another, (even the strongest man can be killed in his sleep), there are limited resources, and yet there is no power able to force men to cooperate. Given these conditions in the State of Nature, Hobbes concludes that the State of Nature would be unbearably brutal. In the State of Nature, every person is always in fear of losing his life to another. They have no capacity to ensure the long-term satisfaction of their needs or desires. No long-term or complex cooperation is possible because the State of Nature can be aptly described as a state of utter distrust. Given Hobbes’ reasonable assumption that most people want first and foremost to avoid their own deaths, he concludes that the State of Nature is the worst possible situation in which men can find themselves. It is the state of perpetual and unavoidable war.Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/#SH2a